Contract Review
What the $PTDC contract actually does
Read this first: this is not a security audit
$PTDC has not been audited by a professional security firm. What follows is a line-by-line review of verified public source code — thorough, but performed without a formal methodology, without a published test suite, and with nobody carrying professional liability if something was missed.
We publish it because the alternative that most projects choose — a badge implying an audit that doesn't exist — is worse. Treat this as a well-informed reading, not a guarantee. Read the source yourself; it's public.
The short version
The contract is a standard fee-on-transfer meme-token template. The dangerous things are absent. The sloppy things are cosmetic or minor. Everything below is checkable against the verified source on Etherscan.
What could have been catastrophic — and isn't
These six properties are where scam tokens hide. Each was checked directly in the source.
| Risk | Present? | Why we can say that |
|---|---|---|
| Hidden mint function | No | _mint is internal and called exactly once, in the constructor. Supply is permanently fixed at 36 trillion. Nobody — including the owner — can create more. |
| Blacklist / holder freeze | No | No address-blocking logic of any kind. No holder can be stopped from transferring. |
| Pause or sell-disable (honeypot) | No | No pause modifier, no trading gate, no sell restriction. Buying and selling cannot be switched off. |
| Uncapped fees | No | Fees are hard-capped at 15% by require statements the owner cannot bypass. |
| Owner can drain liquidity | No | Auto-liquidity LP tokens are sent to 0x…dEaD on creation. They are burned and can never be pulled. |
| Ownership held by an outside party | No | Ownership was transferred to the project wallet in the constructor. |
A token with no mint function and no blacklist cannot rug its holders by design. $PTDC is clean on both.
What the owner can still do
This is the honest centralisation picture, and it's what token scanners will report. We'd rather state it than have you discover it.
- Change the fee percentages — up to the hard cap of 15% each way.
- Change the fee-recipient wallets via owner-only functions.
- Trigger buyback-and-burn — spend ETH the contract holds to buy $PTDC on Uniswap and send it to the dead address.
- Renounce ownership — which permanently removes every power above, including buyback-and-burn.
That last point is a genuine trade-off rather than an obvious win. Renouncing maximises trust scores and locks fees forever; it also destroys the buyback function permanently. Any decision on renouncing will be announced before it happens, not after.
Bugs and defects we found
| Finding | Severity | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Max transaction is 10%, not 1% | Low | The code computes totalSupply * 10 / 100 while the comment claims 1%. A single trade can move 3.6 trillion tokens, so the per-trade cap is not a meaningful limit. Not dangerous — but it does not do what it was written to do. |
| Compiler optimisation disabled | Low | The contract was compiled without optimisation, so every trade costs holders more gas than necessary. Unfixable without redeploying, and not worth a redeploy. |
| Misleading error string | Cosmetic | A sell-fee error message says "30% or less" where the code enforces 15%. No behavioural impact. |
Current on-chain fee settings
The fee parameters currently stored on-chain still reflect the original 2025 configuration. Read directly from mainnet, they are:
| On-chain today | Committed target | |
|---|---|---|
| Treasury donation | 2% buy / 2% sell | 2% buy / 2% sell |
| Project & Growth | 1% buy / 1% sell | 1% buy / 1% sell |
| Liquidity | 1% buy / 1% sell | removed |
| Burn | 1% buy / 1% sell | sell only — 1% |
| Total | 5% / 5% | 3% / 4% |
The 3%/4% structure described on this site is what the project is committing to, and it will be set on-chain before any liquidity is added.
We are stating this rather than quietly waiting to change it, because anyone can read the current values on Etherscan right now and we would rather they hear it here first. When the change is made, the transaction hash will be published.
The presale contract — retired
A separate contract, PayTheDebt_Sale
(0x846eC5f3…9364c43), was deployed in April 2025 for a presale that was cancelled. It
is built on OpenZeppelin Ownable, ReentrancyGuard and
SafeERC20, with a Chainlink price oracle for ETH/USD.
It never custodied tokens or funds. It moved tokens directly out of the project wallet using an ERC-20 allowance, and forwarded buyers' payments straight to the treasury address. That design means the allowance was the only thing giving it any power.
That allowance has been revoked. On 8 August 2026 the approval from the
distribution wallet to the presale contract was set to zero. It is now 0 on-chain,
verifiable by anyone via the token's allowance function.
The presale contract therefore cannot move a single token, regardless of what is called on it or
by whom. Two further points of honesty: the presale's own price-conversion functions currently
return zero for every input we tested, meaning purchases would have reverted anyway; and the
presale's Active flag is still set to true on-chain, which is untidy
rather than dangerous. It will be switched off, and this page will say so when it is.
We flagged an earlier, more serious reading of this contract internally and it turned out to be wrong — it came from a draft source file rather than the deployed bytecode. The deployed contract does not contain that flaw. We mention it because a review that only ever reports confirmations isn't a review.
What this review does not cover
- Economic and market risk. Nothing here says $PTDC is a good investment. Reviewing code says nothing about price.
- Formal verification. No mathematical proofs, no symbolic execution, no fuzzing campaign.
- Live behaviour under adversarial conditions. No mainnet-fork testing against MEV, sandwich attacks, or exotic router interactions.
- Third-party dependencies. The Uniswap V2 router and pair are assumed to behave as documented.
- Off-chain risk. Key management, wallet security and human error sit outside any contract review, and historically are how most projects actually fail.
Verify it yourself
Everything above is derived from public data. None of it requires trusting us.
Supply concentration — the biggest open risk
Because the presale was cancelled, the overwhelming majority of supply currently sits in project wallets. Any honest reading of this token has to start there: it is the single largest risk a buyer faces, larger than anything in the code.
The plan is to split allocations into separate, publicly-labelled wallets so that the published distribution is visible on-chain rather than merely stated on paper, and to commit a portion to liquidity. Until that happens, judge the concentration for yourself on the holder chart above.
Nothing on this page is financial or investment advice. Buying $PTDC carries the risk of losing everything you put in. See the full risk disclosure.